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ABSTRACT
Starting with peaceful protests of people demanding democratic reforms and fundamental rights
from the regime in Damascus, the Syria crisis developed into a full-fledged civil war causing large-
scale death, injury, and displacement. During the first year of the crisis, violence in Syria was
marked by the brutal crackdown of regime forces on protesters. Confronted with a high degree of
violence from state forces, opposition groups gradually organized politically and militarily.
This article focuses on international legal obligations of armed opposition groups in the course of
this crisis. Such obligations are clearly contained in international humanitarian law, and arguably
also in international human rights law. In order to determine the applicable law, the classification
of the situation as either an armed conflict or one of internal tensions and disturbances is
fundamental but controversial. This article examines at what stage of the crisis international
human rights obligations and international humanitarian law obligations of non-state armed
groups became pertinent, and provides reasons why this is the case. It shall be argued that even
before the Syria crisis turned into a non-international armed conflict, opposition groups were
bound by fundamental rules of international human rights law. In addition to these rules, all
parties to the armed conflict became bound by international humanitarian law once the situation
reached a sufficient degree of violence, and the non-state groups a sufficient degree of
organization. By examining the Syria crisis, this article shall show what these abstract criteria
mean in practice.
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Starting with peaceful protests of people demanding democratic reforms and fundamental rights
from the regime in Damascus, the Syria crisis developed into a full-fledged civil war causing large-
scale death, injury, and displacement. During its first year, the brutal crackdown of regime forces
on protesters marked the Syria conflict.1 Confronted with a high degree of violence from state
forces, opposition groups gradually organized politically and militarily. Syrian army defectors as
well as civilians formed armed groups, which strived to defend protesters, villages, and
neighbourhoods. Early on, some of these groups organized under a structure known as the Free
Syrian Army.2 However, instead of creating one united opposition front, over the last three years a
great variety of independent non-state armed groups emerged. Armed groups fighting the Assad
regime have failed to unite under one command structure, which not only weakened their military
capabilities but also lead to substantial in-fighting.3
It has been continuously emphasized that “violations and abuses committed by anti-government
armed groups did not . . . reach the intensity and scale of those committed by government forces
and affiliated militia.”4 Still, different non-state armed groups operating in Syria have been accused
of grave human rights violations,5 war crimes,6 and crimes against humanity.7 From an
international legal perspective, these accusations pose interesting questions: first, can non-state
armed groups violate international human rights law, and if yes, under what circumstance?
Second, the commission of war crimes by any conflicting party requires the existence of an armed
conflict, in the Syria case, a non-international armed conflict. But at what stage did armed violence
in Syria amount to a non-international armed conflict? And third, under what conditions can armed
groups commit crimes against humanity?
The present article focuses on the first two questions: namely whether and under what
conditions non-state groups such as Syrian opposition groups have human rights obligations,
and at what stage internal violence in Syria amounted to an armed conflict. Inquiring into
international legal obligations of non-state armed groups under international human rights and
international humanitarian law is warranted for two main reasons. First, while it has become
uncontroversial that international humanitarian law binds all parties to an armed conflict, as
seen in the Syria crisis, it is often unclear from what threshold this field of law applies.
This question is not only essential to clarify which laws apply to all conflicting parties; it also
determines from which stage alleged crimes could be prosecuted as war crimes. Second, the
applicability of international human rights law to non-state actors is a highly debated issue with
important practical consequences. During situations of internal disturbances or tensions as
prevailing during the first year of the Syria crisis, due to the inapplicability of international
humanitarian law, the field of international law that could protect fundamental human
entitlements was international human rights law.8 In addition, even when international
1For an adequate summary of violent incidents occurring in Syria in 2011, see U.N. H.R.C. Rep. of the independent
international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Sept. 30, 2011-Nov. 15, 2011, UN Doc. A/17/2/Add.1;
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 2 (2011), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SY/A.HRC.S-17.2.Add.1_en.pdf.
2Id. { 29.
3On the negative effects of this lack of a centralized command structure before in-fighting broke out, see U.N. H.
R.C., Rep. of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Jan. 15, 2013-May 15,
2013, {{ 24–25, U.N. Doc. A/23/58; GAOR, 23d Sess., Supp. No. 58 (2013), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-23-58_en.pdf.
4Id., summary. However, in the latest report the Commission of Inquiry no longer made this qualification but
stated “[t]he scale and geographic distribution of violations perpetrated by government forces and pro-government
militia, and non-State armed groups, differ among violations.” U.N. H.R.C. Rep. of the independent international
commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, July 15, 2013-Jan. 20, 2014, U.N. Doc. A/25/65; GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 65 (2014).
5Id., at summary and { 152; see also U.N. H.R.C. Rep. of the independent international commission of inquiry on
the Syrian Arab Republic, Nov. 2011-Feb. 2012, {{ 112–120, U.N. Doc. A/19/69; GAOR, 19th Sess., Supp. 69 (2012),
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session19/A-HRC-19-69_en.pdf.
6See, for example, Human Rights Council, supra note 3, at { 156.
7See Human Rights Watch, “You can still see their blood”: Executions, Indiscriminate Shootings, and Hostage
Taking by Opposition Forces in Latakia Countryside Oct. 2013.
8As emphasized by different commentators, situations that fall short of armed conflicts under IHL are of
particular relevance when discussing human rights obligations of non-state armed groups. See, for example, Nigel
Rodley, Non-State Actors and Human Rights, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
523, 530 (Scott Sheeran & Nigel Rodley eds., 2013).
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humanitarian law applies, the protection offered is limited and does not, for example, include
political rights or certain economic and social rights.9
The examination of these two questions consists of an analysis of the most important legal
sources and applies theoretical findings to facts established by the United Nations Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic.10 Thus, the present article
provides an assessment of the pertinent legal concepts in light of one of the gravest humanitarian
crises of the past years.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE ARMED GROUPS
International human rights law (IHRL) is an international legal regime applicable at all times,
meaning both in times of peace and during armed conflicts.11 IHRL has been binding the Syrian
Government at all times throughout the Syria crisis, particularly between March 2011 and the
beginning of 2012 when the crisis did not amount to an armed conflict.12 The case is possibly
different for non-state entities. Traditionally, human rights are conceived as the “historical
response to the rise of the modern nation state.”13 Accordingly, it is argued that due to their
philosophical origin, human rights only apply to the vertical relation between the state and its
subjects.14 Under international law, the state is primarily responsible for protecting its citizens with
due diligence from human rights violations committed by non-state entities.15 Underpinning this
state-centric view, it can be stressed that all major IHRL treaties are phrased as exclusively
containing obligations for states and that it is doubtable whether non-state groups have
international legal personality.16 Under such a view, non-state groups have no international human
rights obligations. Instead, group members are subject to national law and must respect national
criminal law, the law of the state they are struggling against.
a. Human rights obligations of non-state conflict parties
The traditional state-centric view, however, has broadened to include non-state armed groups that
are party to an armed conflict and exercise control over territory. As Rodley argued in his seminal
piece on the issue of non-state actors’ human rights obligations, this could be the case if the non-
state entity exercised ‘effective power’ and thereby authority over people akin to that normally
exercised by states.17 For Tomuschat, insurgent movements have human rights obligations under
international law because respect for certain fundamental norms is required as part of the “general
framework of rights and duties which every actor seeking to legitimize himself as a suitable player
at the inter-State level must respect.”18 The conclusion that non-state parties to an armed conflict
that exercise control over territory have customary human rights obligations finds further support
9For a more in-depth analysis of this issue, see Annyssa Bellal, Gilles Giacca, and Stuart Casey-Maslen,
International Law and Armed Non-State Actors in Afghanistan, 93 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 47,
63–64 (2011).
10The author believes that the U.N. Commission of Inquiry reports present facts objectively and report on alleged
human rights and international humanitarian law violations of all conflicting parties. These reports have therefore
been chosen as the principle source of information among the publicly available information on the Syria crisis.
11See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion,
2004 I.C.J. 136 { 106 (July 9).
12For a more detailed analysis of human rights obligations in times of emergency, see Tilman Rodenhäuser,
Fundamental Standards of Humanity: How International Law Regulates Internal Strife, 26 JOURNAL FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
PEACE AND ARMED CONFLICT 121 (2013).
13Nigel S. Rodley, Can Armed Opposition Groups Violate Human Rights?, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 299 (Kathleen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds., 1993).
14See C. Ryngaert & M. Noortmann, New Actors in Global Governance and International Human Rights Law, 4
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL DISCOURSE 4, 12 (2010).
15See Daniel Moeckli, et al., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 31 (2010).
16Rodley, supra note 13, at 305–310; Jan Hessbruegge, Human Rights Violations Arising from Conduct of
Non-State Actors, 11 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 38, (2005). Indeed, art. 2 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights provides that it is the duty of the State to “respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights” enshrined in the instrument. International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec.16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95–20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. Similar provision can be found
inter alia in EUR. CONV. ON H. R. art. 1 and AM. CONV. OF H. R. art. 1(1).
17Ibid., at 313.
18Christian Tomuschat, The Applicability of Human Rights Law to Insurgent Movements, in KRISENSICHERUNG UND
HUMANITÄRER SCHUTZ: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR DIETER FLECK ¼ CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION 587 (Horst Fischer & Dieter
Fleck eds., 2004).
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in an argument presented by the Human Rights Committee with regard to the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights: human rights belong to people in a specific territory and
must continue binding the authorities even if the government of a territory changes.19
Accordingly, when in August 2012 the UN Commission of Inquiry concluded that the crisis in
Syria amounted to a non-international armed conflict and that armed opposition groups controlled
parts of Syrian territory, it also found that these groups must “respect the fundamental human
rights of persons forming customary international law.”20 This finding follows an established
practise by UN Commissions, including the UN Commission of Inquiry on Libya, arguing “where
non-state groups exercise de facto control over territory, they must respect fundamental human
rights of persons in that territory.”21 Similarly, the UN Security Council and General Assembly
established a practise of holding non-state armed groups (NSAGs) responsible for human rights
violations during armed conflicts.22 The Security Council frequently “condemns the grave and
systematic violations and human rights abuses” committed by NSAGs23 or demands armed groups
to “cease all abuses of human rights.”24
This brief analysis shows that although major human rights treaties do not contain human rights
obligations for non-state groups, it seems that at the international level a practice and conviction
emerged to hold such groups accountable to customary human rights law when exercising control
over territory. As mentioned above, during armed conflict, IHRL can complement international
humanitarian law, especially with regard to certain rights of political participation and social and
economic rights. In a way, the more such armed groups resemble states they become bound by IHRL.
A further indication for states’ conviction that armed groups can have human rights obligations is
reference to human rights obligations for armed groups in international human rights treaty law.25
Thus, it can be argued that international human rights law binds armed groups in the Syria conflict that
exercise control over territory, and that the Commission of Inquiry is right in demanding accountability
for grave human rights violations such as summary executions or ill-treatment. Yet, during armed
conflicts a significant number of alleged human rights violations also constitute violations of
international humanitarian law, which often prevails as lex specialis, holding armed groups
accountable to human rights law does not have the same impact as it has outside armed conflict.26
b. Human rights obligations of armed non-state groups in other situations of violence
During the initial period of the Syria crisis, armed opposition groups emerged both from Syrian
defectors and from civilians striving to defend their villages or neighbourhoods against regime
violence. No centralized leadership existed for these groups and according to the UN Commission
of Inquiry, violence between them and government forces did not amount to an armed conflict.27
Consequently, only IHRL governed the situation in addition to Syrian national law. At that time,
non-state groups did not exercise control over territory in a state-like manner.28 However, the UN
Commission still found that:
19Human Rights Committee, General Comment 26, { 4, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1, (Dec. 8, 1997).
20U.N. H.R.C. Rep. of the independent international commission of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Feb. 15,
2012-Aug. 15, 2012, { 11, U.N. Doc. A/21/50; GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 50 (2012), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-50_en.pdf. Unfortunately, however, the report did not
specify which human rights provisions it considers customary international law.
21U.N. H.R.C. Rep. of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international
human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Feb. 25, 2011-June 1, 2011, { 72, U.N. Doc. A/17/44; GAOR, 17th Sess.,
Supp. No. 44 (2011).; see also U.N. H.R.C. Human Rights Situation in Palestine and other Occupied Arab Territories,
{ 22, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/22, (May 29, 2009).
22Tomuschat examined a great number of resolutions both by the General Assembly and the Security Council and
points examples where these organs addressed NSAGs to respect human rights in armed conflicts, see Tomuschat,
supra note 18. For a more recent analysis of U.N. Security Counsel practice; see Aristoles Constantinides, Human
Rights Obligations and Accountability of Armed Opposition Groups: the Practice of the UN Security Council, 4 Human
Rights and International Legal Discourse 89, (2010).
23S.C. Res 2067, { 18, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2067 (Sept. 18, 2012) (Somalia).
24S.C. Res 2071, { 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2071 (Dec. 20, 2012) (Mali).
25See art. 4 (1) of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflicts and art. 7(5) of the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.
26One exception, for example, would be the human right of “freedom of expression” which is not found in IHL.
27Human Rights Council, supra note 5, at { 122.
28According to the Commission of Inquiry, the Syrian army only withdrew temporarily from certain areas. Id. at { 20.
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[A]t a minimum, human rights obligations constituting peremptory international law (ius
cogens) bind States, individuals and non-State collective entities, including armed groups.
Acts violating ius cogens – for instance, torture or enforced disappearances – can never
be justified.29
Thus, it argued that peremptory human rights law binds non-state armed groups even if they are
not party to an armed conflict or acting as de facto authority in a determined territory. In this
respect, the UN Commission went further than any other UN Commission or organ before.
This progressive finding is not unsupported in international law. Different UN reports indicate
that non-state armed groups may have human rights obligations without being engaged in an
armed conflict or exercising de facto control over territory. For example, in his function as the
United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Alston
regarded human rights as operating “on three levels - as the rights of individuals, as obligations
assumed by States, and as legitimate expectations of the international community.”30 He found
that although a non-state actor “does not have legal obligations under ICCPR, . . . it remains
subject to the demand of the international community, first expressed in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR), that every organ of society respect and promote human rights.”31 Alston
explains that calling a non-state armed group to respect IHRL is “especially appropriate” if the
group “exercises significant control over territory and population and has an identifiable political
structure.”32 This statement does not exclude that the international community can subject armed
groups to its legitimate expectations in situations in which the entity does not fulfil these
conditions. Although such “legitimate expectations” cannot per se be equalled to obligations
under international law,33 one may wonder whether they are only non-legal expectations. Following
Alston’s finding that these expectations have first been expressed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the customary character of a numbercustomary character of provisions contained in
the UDHR could suggest that these “legitimate expectations” are legally binding on all
international legal actors – including armed groups.
Scholars have further discussed this idea, especially Clapham. Convincingly, he argues that
human rights as formulated in the UDHR are primarily individual entitlements protecting the dignity
of all individual human beings.34 As internationally protected human rights exist, the question
follows which entities are bound to respect them? Different branches of international law,
especially IHL and international criminal law, recognize legal obligations not only of states but also
of individual human beings and of non-state groups, and in principle there is nothing in
international law that precludes the existence of human rights obligations of non-state actors.
As recently suggested by a group of scholars, one source of such obligations could be ius
cogens.35
Following increasing academic debate on this question and the practice of different UN human
rights mandate holders, states in the Human Rights Council condemned in a resolution on Mali in
July 2012 “the human rights violations and acts of violence committed in northern Mali, in
particular by the rebels, terrorist groups and other organized transnational crime networks . . . .”36
29Id. at { 106.
30Extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur Philip Alston, Addendum,
Mission to Sri Lanka, { 25, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/53/Add.5, (2006).
31Id.
32Id. at { 26.
33Ryngaert & Noortmann, supra note 14, at 70. Ryngaert argues that this statement: “stopped short of stating that
armed groups incur direct human rights obligations”.
34Andrew Clapham, The Rights and Responsibilities of Armed Non-State Actors: The Legal Landscape & Issues
Surrounding Engagement, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 4, 24 (2010).
35International Law Association, The Hague Conference, Non-state actors, para. 3.2 (2010). The ILA stated:
“consensus appears . . . that currently NSAs do not incur direct human rights obligations enforceable under
international law. Exceptions include violations of jus cogens norms, the duty of insurgents to comply with
international humanitarian law, and perhaps, ‘legitimate expectations’ of the international community that NSAs
comply with certain norms . . . ”
36U.N. H.R.C. Human rights situation in Mali, July 17, 2012, { 2 U.N. Doc. A/20/17; GAOR, 20th Sess., Supp. No. 17
(2012). On a discussion of the Human Rights Council’s practice in the following resolutions as well as the seemingly
political distinction between human rights violations and abuses, see Andrew Clapham, HUMAN RIGHTS AND NON-STATE
ACTORS, xxviii, fn.39 (2013).
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Neither states nor other UN mandate holders or the scholars discussed here make their findings
dependent on control over territory or the exercise of government authority. Instead, practice of
UN organs suggests that a norm emerges under general international law requiring respect of
fundamental human rights norms by non-state actors at all times, simply because violations
of the most basic individual rights can never be justified.
The finding that peremptory human rights norms bind states as well as non-state entities and
individuals provides a seemingly unlimited scope of application: any individual or group of
individuals would have international human rights obligations. The Human Rights Council explicitly
included terrorist groups and other organized transnational crime networks among the alleged
authors of human rights violations. This raises the question whether that would not turn any crime
into a human rights violation and thereby dilute the concept of human rights violations under
international law? Asked differently, are criminals under national law in many cases also human
rights violators under international law? This author believes that this scope would be too broad.
Under international law, states have an obligation not only to respect human rights but also to
protect their citizens with due diligence against human rights violations. This rule applies “in
relation to the acts of individual third parties, even irregular armed groups of any kind.”37
However, this rule has limitations. In practice, “the measures that a State might take to meet this
[due diligence] obligation will be constrained by democratic principles and practical considerations
of resources.”38 It is also limited if states are unable to control non-state entities despite a
genuine effort to subject them to state power. In such cases, while grave violations of human
rights may occur, the state’s obligation to protect individuals under its jurisdiction with due
diligence is not necessarily infringed. Thus, if international law aims to protect core values
including the most fundamental rights of the individual, it must reach beyond the state.
In situations where non-state groups act outside the control of states, and states’ national
criminal laws do not apply effectively, non-state actors should be considered bound by IHRL.39
Otherwise, human rights were violated without engaging any actor’s international responsibility.
c. The practical importance of holding non-state actors accountable for
human rights violations
In a situation such as the Syria crisis, the question arises whether emphasizing armed group’s
human rights obligations and pointing towards alleged violations has any practical relevance. After
all, no international court exists to hold armed groups accountable for human rights violations.40
Yet, applying fundamental human rights to armed groups is important for several reasons. First,
philosophically human rights are not primarily state obligations but entitlements of the individual,
protecting every human being’s dignity. In this respect, human rights protect the individual against
any infringements; especially if armed groups operate beyond state control, as armed opposition
groups did in Syria. By holding armed groups accountable to fundamental, arguably peremptory,
human rights norms, the international community also defines basic values that every member of
this community must respect.41
Second, impartial reporting on a situation of internal disturbances where two opposing parties
commit human rights violations requires reference to both parties’ misconduct. Otherwise, the
report may appear one-sided. Reporting on armed groups’ human rights violations can also entail
very practical consequences. Reliable proof that armed groups commit human rights violations
37The Case of the Communities of the Jiguamiandó and the Curbaradó, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. E), {11 (Mar. 6, 2003). This obligation is well established under the main human rights treaties, see Velasquez
Rodriguez v. Honduras, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 4. (July 20, 1988). Osman v. The United Kingdom,
23452/94 ECHR 101 (Oct. 28, 1998). Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31: Nature of the General Legal
Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, { 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/ Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
38Barbara Frey, Human Rights Council, Prevention of human rights violations committed with small arms and light
weapons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/29 (June 25, 2003).
39Tilman Rodenhäuser, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups in Other Situations of Violence:
The Syria Example, 3 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 263–290 (2013) (discussing further elaborations of this approach).
40See Julia Kozma, Manfred Nowak & Martin Scheinin, A World Court of Human Rights – Consolidated Draft
Statute and Commentary (2010) (discussing the idea of a World Court of Human Rights as well as a draft statute that
would include human rights violations by non-state actors) available at http://www.eui.eu/Documents/Departments
Centres/Law/Professors/Scheinin/ConsolidatedWorldCourtStatute.pdf.
41Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95–17/1-T, Judgment, {154 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Dec. 10, 1998).
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damages their international reputation and possibly diminishes the likelihood of external
support – materially, politically, and morally. As many opposition groups strive to become the
legitimate and internationally recognized government of their country, their human rights record is
important. For an opposition group fighting a state army, external support in equipment, including
arms, is vital.
Third, states’ political hesitation to support armed groups with weapons may in future turn into
a legal obligation once the Arms Trade Treaty is in force. Under its article 7(3), states shall not
export weapons if they assess that there is an overriding risk that the arms could be used to
“commit or facilitate a serious violation of international human rights law.”42 International actors
continuous and transparent reporting on possible human rights violations by such groups could
clarify whether such overriding risk exists.
As a result, the decision by the UN Commission of Inquiry to hold Syrian opposition groups
accountable to fundamental human rights serves the purpose of protecting the “inherent dignity
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family”43, is required for
impartial international reporting, and can have important practical consequences for armed groups.
Scrutinizing armed groups’ respect for human rights also responds adequately to patterns of
human rights abuses in today’s situations of instability, disturbances, and tensions. In the words
of the UN Special Rapporteur on Terrorism:
[I]t is a central tenet of international human rights law that it must keep pace with a
changing world. Some of the gravest violations of human rights are nowadays committed
by, or on behalf of, non-State actors operating in conflict situations of one kind or
another . . . If international human rights law is to keep pace with these changes, the
victims . . . must now be recognised as victims of grave violations of international human
rights law.44
III. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OBLIGATIONS OF NON-STATE GROUPS IN
NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS
While debate persists to what extent non-state armed groups have obligations under international
human rights law, all parties to an armed conflict have obligations under international
humanitarian law (IHL).45 As Syria is not party to Additional Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions,
the laws applicable to the present non-international armed conflict are Common Article 3 and
customary IHL. Common Article 3 outlines some fundamental humanitarian standards that were
explicitly developed for internal conflict, and a number of serious violations of IHL also constitute
war crimes. To render IHL and the war crimes regime applicable, a situation must amount to an
armed conflict. Yet, no international authority exists to make binding conflict classifications during
situations of armed violence, and classifications by the conflicting parties are often politically
motivated. Thus, international law expert opinions are often the only reliable source. In Syria,
conflict classification was particularly difficult because violence did not break out between two pre-
existing armies but evolved between state armed forces and an opposition movement that formed
and developed during the crisis and without centralized leadership. Despite several thousand
people killed by armed violence during the first year of the crisis,46 in February 2012 the UN
Commission of Inquiry found itself unable to confirm that Syria was in a state of non-international
armed conflict.47 It was only in May 2012 that the ICRC declared publicly that during the preceding
months, violence in some parts of Syria had amounted to an armed conflict.48 Since this time,
42Article 7(3) Arms Trade Treaty.
43Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
44U.N. H.C.R. Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms while countering terrorism, Aug. 1, 2011-Apr. 2, 2012, { 12, U.N. Doc. A/20/14; GAOR, Sess. 20, Supp. No. 14
(2012), http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G12/137/80/PDF/G1213780.pdf?OpenElement.
45This is clear from the wording of Common Article 3 which refers to obligations of “each Party to the conflict”,
which in a non-international armed conflict is at least one non-state group. Jean Simon Pictet, THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY: I 37, (1952). For a recognition that not only Common Article 3 but also customary
international binds non-state parties, see Prosecutor v. Norman, (Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber,
{ 22, May 31, 2004).
46See Human Rights Council, supra note 5, at { 24–25.
47Ibid., {13.
48Stephanie Nebehay, Some Syria violence amounts to civil war: Red Cross, Reuters, May 8, 2012, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/08/us-syria-redcross-idUSBRE8470D920120508.
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violence has continuously escalated and today multiple armed conflicts exist in Syria, both
between non-state groups and the Assad regime, as well as between armed groups.
a. Classification of non-international armed conflicts
During the decades following the adoption of the Geneva Conventions and their Common Article 3,
the meaning of an ‘armed conflict not of an international character’ remained unclear.49 This was
only partly alleviated by the adoption of Additional Protocol II, which arguably contains a much
higher threshold than Common Article 3.50 Thus, when the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was tasked to adjudicate on alleged war crimes committed in a non-
international armed conflict, it established the following formula, which adequately reflects the
notion of armed conflict as existing under IHL:
An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups
or between such groups within a State.51
The ICTY and other tribunals applied this formula in their judgments, international commissions of
inquiry referred to it, and states included it almost verbatim in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court.52 This interpretation of the armed conflict threshold forms part of
customary international law.53 Although this formula today is undisputed and constitutes a
milestone in international humanitarian and criminal law, this success is also due to the fact that
it is sufficiently broad to encapsulate different interpretations.54
Early on, the ICTY clarified that the Tadic formula requires examination of the intensity of
violence and the organization of the parties to the conflict.55 In the context of non-international
armed conflicts, these criteria serve the purpose “of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry,
unorganized and short-lived insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to
international humanitarian law.”56 Similarly, the ICC examines the degree of organization of the
groups involved and the intensity of violence to establish whether an armed conflict exists.57
These two criteria have been established as the sole requirements for conflict classification.
In contrast, examining whether the non-state party controls territory is not a requirement sine qua
non to establish the existence of a non-international armed conflict, although it can be a strong
indicator for the group’s degree of organization and its relative strength as compared to state
forces.58 Similarly, “the purpose of the armed forces to engage in acts of violence or also achieve
some further objective is . . . irrelevant.”59 The requirements of sufficient intensity of violence and
49Common Article 3 does not contain a definition of an ‘armed conflict not of an international character’.
The criteria contained in the ICRC commentary on the article are ‘convenient’ but not binding. See infra note 64.
50This view was taken, for example, by the ICTY. Prosecutor v. Boskoski and Tarkulovski, Judgment, { 197,
Case No. IT-04–82-T (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008). For an alternative view, see Sandesh
Sivakumaran, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT, 197 (2012).
51Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, { 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
52Art. 8(2)(f) ICC Statute. For a accurate summary on the extent to which the Tadic formula got accepted in
international practice, see Anthony Cullen, THE CONCEPT OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW,
120–122, (2010).
53The Tadic formula is today included in numerous national military manuals as the definition of non-international
armed conflicts. See, for example, military handbooks of Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Peru or the
United Kingdom (translations on file with the author). The view that this formula presents customary international law
is also shared by commentators, see Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
A COMMENTARY 423 (Antonio Cassese, et al., eds., 2002).; Sivakumaran, supra note 50, at 155.
54An important and concise interpretation of the notion of armed conflict is provided by the ICRC: International
Committee of the Red Cross, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, available
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.
55Tadic, supra note 51, at { 562. This two-pronged test has been applied by many ICTY chamber since then. See
also Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj and Lahi Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgement, { 49 (Int’l Crim.
Tri. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008).
56Tadic, supra note 51, { 562 This formulation also reflects the definition of armed conflicts as included in art. 1
(2) Additional Protocol II.
57See Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. 01/04-01/06, { 537–538 (ICC Mar. 14, 2012).
58Haradinaj et al., supra note 55, { 73; Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 57, { 536.
59See Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, { 170 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia (Nov. 30, 2005)).
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the degree of organization of the non-state party shall be briefly analysed in the following two
sections, before conflict classification in Syria is analysed more closely.
i. Intensity
The intensity of violence is a rather obvious requirement for establishing the existence of a non-
international armed conflict. The notions of ‘armed conflict’ or the ‘laws of war’ inherently require a
certain degree of violence going beyond what states are normally able to contain by means of law
enforcement. In their jurisprudence, the ICTY and the ICC referred to a number of indicative factors
that signify a sufficient degree of violence – none of which, however, is decisive by itself.60 These
factors include the seriousness of confrontations and whether violence increases, the type and
number of armed forces involved in confrontations, the types of weapons used, the amount of
destruction caused by the fighting, and the number of persons displaced by it. Another indicator
has been whether the situation attracted the attention of the UN Security Council.61 While findings
on these factors do not normally pose major challenges because they are public, the degree of
organization of an armed group is more difficult to analyse.
ii. Organization
At first sight, a sufficient degree of organization of the parties involved is a less straightforward
criterion for qualifying a situation of internal violence as a non-international armed conflict.
Commentators suggested that in situations where violence of a significant level occurs and the
armed group is capable to engage in armed action, being organized is “of minor importance”62 or
“looses some of its significance.”63 In contrast, international tribunals have insisted on both the
intensity and the organization criterion, and so does the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). Referring to fundamental considerations underlying IHL, the ICRC explained:
The very logic underlying IHL requires identifiable parties in the above sense [i.e. having a
certain level of organization, command structure and, therefore, the ability to implement
international humanitarian law] because this body of law, while not affecting the parties’
legal status, establishes equality of rights and obligations among them under IHL (not
domestic law) when they are at war. The parties’ IHL rights and obligations are provided
for so that both sides know the rules within which they are allowed to operate and so that
they are able to rely on similar conduct by the other side.64
Thus, although in practice it is more difficult to assess and arguably of secondary importance if a
situation shows a high degree of violence, it seems that the very notion of an armed conflict
requires two organized conflicting parties. Parties must be more than loosely connected individuals
or protesting masses. As with regard to the intensity of violence, international tribunals established
indicative factors that testify of a sufficient degree of organization.65 These factors can be
distinguished as those indicating the ability to engage in military operations, and factors indicating
the ability to respect fundamental rules of IHL and other engagements. The first category includes
the group’s command structure, its ability to plan and implement military operations over a
sustained period, and the logistics, including weapons and ammunition, available to the
group. The second category includes again the groups command structure or hierarchy, its level of
discipline as well as the ability to disseminate and implement rules, and the group’s ability to
speak with one voice.66 Importantly, a certain level of discipline and the ability to implement rules
60The ‘convenient criteria’ as included in the Pictet commentary on CA3 are too demanding, and as an
examination of the travaux préparatoires shows reflect criteria invoked by states for the application of all norms of
the Geneva Convention in non-international armed conflict and not to the application of the ‘elementary
considerations of humanity’ as contained in the final article.
61Boskoski and Tarkulovski, supra note 50, { 177; Haradinaj, supra note 55, { 394; Dyilo, supra note 57, { 538.
62Arne W. Dahl & Magnus Sandu, The Threshold of Armed Conflict, 45 MILITARY AND LAW OF WAR REVIEW 376, (2006).
63Andrea Bianchi and Yasmin Naqvi, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND TERRORISM, 17 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT & SECURITY LAW
129 (2011).
64International Committee of the Red Cross, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED
CONFLICTS, { 232 (Dec. 2003).
65See, for example, Haradinaj, supra note 55, { 395; Boskoski and Tarkulovski, supra note 50, at 199–206; and
Dyilo, supra note 57, { 537.
66These factors are drawn from the judgements in the preceding footnote.
Page 9 of 16
Rodenhäuser. International Review of Law 2015:2
does not require actual respect for IHL: a party to an armed conflict can be well-disciplined and
organized but decide consciously to disregard fundamental humanitarian provisions.67
b. Implications from conflict classification in Syria
Examining the evolution of the Syria crisis as recorded in the UN Commission of Inquiry reports,
adds to clarifying at what point a situation of internal tensions and disturbances develops into a
non-international armed conflict.68 Right from the start of the Syria crisis, state forces employed a
significant level of violence. Reportedly, throughout summer and autumn 2011 the Damascus
regime called upon its armed forces to quell protests and to mount checkpoints. Allegedly, the
regime’s strategy included the use of snipers and heavy weapons in populated neighbourhoods.69
As a response to state violence, defectors and civilians formed armed groups including the Free
Syrian Army (FSA), and members of these groups started armed operations against security
forces.70 Yet, at that stage, the crisis was better categorized as internal disturbances or tensions
and not yet as an armed conflict in the legal sense.
Due to increasing resistance from armed opposition groups and the regime’s fierce response,
fighting in certain areas of Syria intensified during late 2011 and early 2012.71 Armed opposition
groups intensified military operations against softer state targets such as checkpoints or security
forces buildings.72 Still, by mid-February 2012, international actors such as the UN Commission of
Inquiry hesitated to qualify the situation as one of armed conflict because “it was unable to verify
that the Free Syrian Army (FSA), local groups identifying themselves as such or other anti-
Government armed groups had reached the necessary level of organization.”73 Arguably, the
wording suggests that it was not categorically excluded but simply unclear whether, and in which
areas of Syria, violence amounted to an armed conflict. In contrast, the ICRC found that in
February 2012 fighting in some specific areas of Syria reached the threshold of a non-international
armed conflict, stressing that opposition forces had become more organized and increasingly
employed guerrilla tactics.74
Analysing the conflict classification by the different actors underlines a number of important
points, which contribute to the clarification of the meaning of the term non-international armed
conflict under IHL. First, a high degree of violence is not alone decisive for qualifying a situation of
internal violence as a non-international armed conflict. As long as violence is primarily one-sided,
even the employment of armed forces or heavy weapons against civilians does not turn the
situation into an armed conflict. Rather, in cases where violence by state forces is committed as
part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, even outside
armed conflict it can amount to crimes against humanity.75
Second, an internal armed conflict requires at least two organized parties engaging in military
operations against each other. Presupposing that a state is disposing of an organized armed force
with military capabilities, IHL becomes applicable and binds all parties to an armed conflict once
the non-state groups develop sufficient capabilities to become party to an armed conflict. In this
respect, the ability to plan and implement military operations against the opponent is crucial – be
they described as offensive or defensive. Such actions must not be merely isolated conduct by
small groups of individuals. Hostilities between the conflicting parties are required.76 In addition, a
party to an armed conflict cannot consist of small individual armed bands operating independently
from each other, which the state would be able to supress by law enforcement measures.77 Rather,
67See Boskoski and Tarkulovski, supra note 50, { 204.
68Again, this author does not claim that the UN Commission of Inquiry reports contain complete information on
all facts. Yet, he decided to base his analysis primarily on these reports because among the publicly available
information he finds that these reports contain objectively and verified information.
69See Human Rights Council, supra note 1, { 41–51.
70Id. { 28–29 and 39.
71See Human Rights Council, supra note 5, { 39.
72Id. { 19.
73Id. { 13.
74See Nebehay, supra note 48.
75This was rightly pointed out by the Syria Commission of Inquiry, see Human Rights Council, supra note 1, { 101.
76See Boskoski and Tarkulovski, supra note 50, { 185.
77See Human Rights Council, supra note 5, { 13. This idea is also found in ICTY jurisprudence with regard to early
stage of the KLA insurgency in Kosovo, see Haradinaj, supra note 55, { 407–410.
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small bands must unite under one structure or at least coordinate their actions. A basic command
structure enables an armed group to conduct military operations as well as to disseminate rules,
impose discipline, and thereby to respect basic provisions of IHL. This does not mean that all
armed groups operating in Syria were required to unite under one centralized structure. As the
ICRC emphasized, violence in certain parts of the country between state armed forces and the
local armed opposition forces can amount to an armed conflict.
Recognizing the existence of different non-state parties to the conflict also suggests that
different non-international armed conflicts exzist in Syria.78 This means first that the Syrian
government is arguably involved in different conflicts with different armed groups, including at
least one conflict with groups affiliated with the Supreme Military Council, one with Syrian Islamic
armed groups, and one with the Islamic State.79 Ending one of these conflicts would not
necessarily affect the other conflicts. In addition, fighting between armed opposition groups
suggests that there may also exist an armed conflict between different armed groups – which
again is independent from the conflicts between the groups and the Assad regime.
Third, in order to qualify as party to a non-international armed conflict, IHL does not require
non-state parties to have state-like capabilities. Military operations by non-state parties can take
the form of guerrilla attacks consisting of hit-and-run assaults against softer state military
targets.80 Another tactic frequently used by non-state armed groups is the employment of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs).81 In times of peace, from a state’s perspective, such attacks
would qualify as “terrorist attacks.” Accordingly, the Assad regime blamed a number of bombings
against state targets to what it called “terrorist saboteurs.”82 While even during armed conflict
bombings against certain targets can qualify as unlawful acts of terrorism;83 governments’ claim
that their opponents are merely terrorists or bandits is irrelevant for the qualification of conflicts.
What is essential is that violence, possibly including alleged acts of terrorism, is not isolated but
reaches the level of military confrontations between two organized armed parties.84
Once the armed conflict threshold is met, IHL spells out clear obligations for all conflicting
parties, including non-state groups, and serious violations of this legal regime can be prosecuted
as war crimes. While the advantages of increased clarity on the applicable law and the prospective
of criminal accountability argue in favour of concluding earlier rather than later that an armed
conflict exists, this conclusion should not be drawn easily. Before IHL applies, violence does not
occur in a legal vacuum, but is governed by national law and international human rights law, the
latter arguably including obligations both for states and for non-state actors. Comparing these two
international regimes, it appears that IHL contains more permissive rules on the use of force as
well as with regard to the deprivation of liberty.85 Thus, in order to achieve the highest degree
of protection for all individuals, prudence in qualifying a situation of internal violence as a
non-international armed conflict is advisable.
78Almost since the beginning, non-state armed forces consist of different and distinct armed groups. See Human
Rights Council, supra note 20, at Annex III, { 8–17.
79For a rough mapping of armed groups involved in the conflict, see Human Rights Council, supra note 4, { 16.
80See Haradinaj, supra note 55, { 87; Boskoski and Tarkulovski, supra note 50, { 276.
81See Human Rights Council, supra note 20, at Annex III, { 10.
82Human Rights Council, supra note 5, { 22.
83Under customary international humanitarian law, “[a]cts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.” Louise Doswald-Beck & Jean-Marie Henckaerts, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME 1: RULES, rule 2 (2005).
84See Boskoski and Tarkulovski, supra note 50, { 185–190.
85For a good discussion of the rules on the use of force and detention under IHL and IHRL, see Marco Sassòli &
Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law Where It Matters:
Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 90 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS, (2008). See also International Committee of the Red Cross, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE CHALLENGES OF
CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS, { 17–20 (Oct. 31, 2011).; David Kretzmer, Rethinking the Application of IHL in Non-
International Armed Conflicts, 42 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 8, 24–25 (2009).; Yves Sadoz, Discours d’Ouverture: La Pertinance
del la Catégorisation des Conflits Armés: Une Réelle Différence dans la Protection des Personnes Touchées?, ARMED
CONFLICTS AND PARTIES TO ARMED CONFLICTS UNDER IHL: CONFRONTING LEGAL CATEGORIES TO CONTEMPORARY REALITIES - PROCEEDINGS OF THE
BRUGES COLLOQUIUM, 17 (2009).
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c. The possible internationalization of the conflict
The armed conflict in Syria is affecting stability of the broader region and involves actors from
different neighbouring states. For example, Hezbollah admitted its active military involvement on
the side of the Assad regime in Syria,86 and reports suggest that Iran is supporting the Assad
regime at least with advice, training and supplies,87 and allegedly also with troops.88 On the other
hand, the Syrian opposition is receiving external support, and the group “Islamic State,” for
example, operates not only in Syria but also in neighbouring Iraq.89 In addition, following the use
of chemical weapons in Syria, there was a real threat of the use of force by third states against
the Assad regime. The involvement of third states in the conflict in Syria could possibly change
the classification of the conflict, and if the armed conflict in Syria, or parts of it, were to be
qualified as an international armed conflict, under specific circumstance this could also change
the rules applicable to the non-state parties.90
An international armed conflict exists under international humanitarian law “in case of armed
hostilities between States through their respective armed forces or other actors acting on behalf of
the State.”91 In the Syria case, this means that if third states or militia acting on behalf of a third
state intervene in support and with permission of the Assad regime against non-state forces, the
character of the conflict would not change. The conflict would continue to oppose a state and
non-state actors. Thus, the law applicable to all parties remains IHL of non-international armed
conflicts.
If third states decided to attack the Assad regime, backed by a UN mandate or not, the attack
would trigger an international armed conflict between Syria and the intervening states.92 However,
such international armed conflict would occur parallel to the existing non-international armed
conflict and would not change the law applicable in the latter. Again, the rules applicable to non-
state armed groups would remain the same. Following the recent judgment of the International
Criminal Court in the Lubanga case, this may only change if it can be determined that armed
opposition groups act under the overall control of a third state.93 In this case, the armed group’s
acts become attributable to the state exercising overall control over the group, which would
internationalize the conflict.94 Overall control, however, is not exercised by “the mere provision of
financial assistance or military equipment or training.”95 What would be required is “organising,
coordinating or planning the military actions”96 of the armed group. Only if this relatively high
threshold is met would the character of the conflict change, and IHL of international armed
conflicts would apply to this inter-state conflict. In these circumstances, the laws of international
armed conflicts would similarly bind the armed group that is acting on behalf of the third state.
However, given the diversity of armed groups operating in Syria, if one group was acting on behalf
86See Human Rights Council, supra note 3, { 23.
87See Will Fulton, et al., IRANIAN STRATEGY IN SYRIA, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF WAR (May 2013), http://www.understandi
ngwar.org/report/iranian-strategy-syria.
88See, for example, Robert Fisk, World Exclusive: US Urges UK and France to Join in Supplying Arms to Syrian
Rebels as MPs Fear that UK Will be Drawn into Growing Conflict, The Independent, June 16, 2013, at http://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-to-send-4000-troops-to-aid-president-assad-forces-in-syria-8660358.
html.
89On external support to opposition groups, see U.N. H.R.C. Report of the independent international commission
of inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, Feb. 5, 2013, {{ 23–28, U.N. Doc A/22/59; GAOR, 22nd Sess., Supp. No. 59
(2013), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A.HRC.22.59_en.pdf.
90In international armed conflicts a broad range of international treaties can apply, most notably the Four Geneva
Conventions and their Additional Protocol I. In addition, the war crimes regime changes as well, see art. 8(2)(a-b) ICC
Statute.
91Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, { 223 (ICC, 15 June 2009).
92This was the case, for example, in Libya. See supra 21,{ 66.
93See Dyilo, supra note 57, { 541.
94The International Court of Justice found that for attributing wrongful acts committed by an armed group to a
state on whose behalf the group is allegedly acting, it must be proven that the state exercises ‘effective control’ over
the state. ‘Effective control’ requires a higher degree of control than ‘overall control’. See the case concerning
application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina
v. Serbia and Montenegro), (2007) I.C.J. Rep. 43, { 403–406. If, however, the view of the ICC is followed and the
‘overall control’ test applies, this test must also suffice to attribute the wrongful acts to the state on whose behalf
they are committed. It would be logically inconsistent to have a conflict between two states in which one state is not
responsible for its acts.
95Tadic, supra note 51, { 137; see also Dyilo, supra note 57, { 541.
96Tadic, supra note 51, { 137; see also Dyilo, supra note 57, { 541.
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of a third state and would thus become involved in an international armed conflict, a non-
international conflict would continue between the Assad regime and other non-state groups.
Although there is currently no internationalization of the armed conflict in Syria that would
change the law applicable to the conflicting parties, IHL of non-international armed conflicts does
contain obligations for states that are not directly involved in the conflict. These obligations are
particularly relevant for those states that support conflicting parties financially, with weapons, or
by providing training. As the International Court of Justice emphasized, under IHL all states have
the obligation to ensure respect for the applicable rules by all conflicting parties.97 At a minimum,
states shall not “encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict . . . to act in violation of
the provisions of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.”98 The ICRC finds that
under customary international law all states have the obligation to “do all in their power to ensure
that international humanitarian law is respected.”99 This means that especially states that provide
support to either of the conflicting parties must use their leverage to ensure respect for the law.
In practice, this could mean formally protesting against alleged violations to provide training and
advice on lawful conduct, provide financial and material assistance dependent on compliance
with fundamental humanitarian provisions, or to prosecute alleged war criminals under their
jurisdiction.
IV. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HUMANITARIAN LAW OBLIGATIONS OF ARMED GROUPS
Determining that non-state armed groups have international legal obligations under both
international human rights and humanitarian law leads to questions of their practical
implementation. Common Article 3 contains fundamental humanitarian norms that apply to all
conflicting parties and additional norms can be drawn from customary IHL.100 In contrast, it is less
clear which international human rights norms form part of customary international law and thus
apply to armed groups in Syria, and because Common Article 3 was explicitly established to
govern armed conflicts, this provision prevails as lex specialis.101 Allegations emerged that non-
state groups engaged in the “execution of civilians and individuals no longer participating in
hostilities [which] is a clear violation of international human rights and international humanitarian
law and may constitute war crimes.”102 Common Article 3 explicitly prohibits “the passing of
sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a
regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples.”103 Even if armed groups were willing to respect this rule, it would pose
particular challenges for them.104
According to the Commission of Inquiry, following the breakdown of the state judicial system in
those parts of Syria that are no longer controlled by the Assad regime, opposition groups set up
their own judicial infrastructure based on social structures and religious institutions.105 Given the
difficult circumstances in which they operate, tribunals were established on an ad hoc basis,
judges were either imams or judges who formerly served in state institutions, and they applied a
“hybrid of Syrian criminal and Islamic law.”106 During trials, it is alleged that the accused were not
permitted a defense, had no right to appeal, and evidence that had been obtained under torture
97This obligation cannot, however, consist of a unilateral decision to use military force against an alleged violator
of international humanitarian law.
98Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Yugoslavia (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), (1986) I.C.J. Rep. 14, { 220.
99Doswald-Beck & Henckaerts, supra note 83, at 510.
100For a list of which norms the ICRC considered to be customary, see id.
101Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, (2004) I.C.J. Rep. 136,
{ 105–106. See also Sassòli & Olson, supra note 85.
102See High Commissioner for Human Rights, Syria: soaring number of executions in violation of international law
– Pillay (January 16, 2014) at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID¼14173.
103Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
104Indeed, the U.N. Commission of Inquiry has continuously emphasized that non-state groups engage in
extrajudicial killings without conducting trials or if they do so, without affording fundamental judicial guarantees.
See Human Rights Council, supra note 20, { 58–60; Human Rights Council, supra 88 { 63.
105See Human Rights Council, 4th Report of Commission of Inquiry on Syria, para. Annex V { 15, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/22/59 (Feb. 5, 2013).
106Id., { 16.
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was permitted. Against this background, the Commission of Inquiry concluded that members of
armed opposition groups committed “the war crime of murder or the war crime of sentencing or
execution without due process.”107 This finding raises the question of how non-state groups can
operate a judicial system in a non-international armed conflict without violating fundamental
procedural rules?
According to the ICRC Customary IHL Study, the criterion of a regularly constituted court requires
the tribunal be established in accordance with existing laws.108 The tribunal, as a judicial organ,
shall be independent from other branches of government, and the judges shall be impartial with
regard to the case before them.109 During the process, the ICRC found that a significant number
of due process guarantees must be respected, including the nullum crimen sine lege principle.110
In drawing their comprehensive list of due process guarantees allegedly part of customary
international law and thereby interpreting what is a “regularly constituted court” which affords all
fundamental judicial guarantees, the ICRC Study drew significantly on international human rights
law. 111 While reflecting state practice and capacity, it is admittedly difficult for armed groups to
comply with these requirements.
Still, as Common Article 3 and customary IHL address states and non-state armed groups,
it must be assumed that non-state groups should, in principle, be able to apply this norm. The
standard of a regularly constituted court respecting the judicial guarantees such as the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege, however, raises the required standard to a level that is difficult to respect
for groups that are engaged in active hostilities and whose control over territory may only be
transitory. While a comprehensive discussion of these requirements would go beyond the scope
of this article, different interpretations of the relevant criteria could provide guidance to armed
groups.112 An interpretation that includes a real possibility for non-state groups to comply with a
fair trial standard could be one entailing “a mixture involving a loose interpretation of the legal
basis, with emphasis on the judicial guarantees requirement.”113
According to the ICRC customary law study, a “court is regularly constituted if it has been
established and organised in accordance with the laws and procedures already in force in a
country.”114 If this meant that only courts established in accordance with state law can be regularly
constituted, it is impossible for armed groups to operate a court in accordance with IHL.
In contrast, if the laws and procedures in force include laws enacted by a non-state group that
exercises de facto control over a territory, such groups could effectively set up regularly constituted
courts. When states agreed on the ICC Elements of Crimes, they did not emphasize the legal basis
of a court as essential, but found that a regularly constituted court must afford “essential
guarantees of independence and impartiality.”115 Similarly, article 6(2) of Additional Protocol II
does not explicitly require a court to be regularly constituted but places emphasis on that it offers
“essential guarantees.” Accordingly, in the particular situation of tribunals established by armed
groups in non-international armed conflicts, the independence of the court from the influence of
other actors and its impartiality with regard to cases before it should be decisive, and not the
question of whether it was setup in accordance with a formally adopted law.
While the principle of nullum crimen sine lege is fundamental to avoid arbitrary judgments, this
principle would again not provide for the particular situation of non-state parties to armed
conflicts if convictions could only be based on “criminal offence under national (meaning state) or
international law.”116 Contrary to this specification of which laws can be invoked, Additional
Protocol II simply stresses that any convictions must be based on an act constituting a criminal
107Id., { 33.
108Doswald-Beck & Henckaerts, supra note 83, at 355.
109Id., at 355–356.
110See id. at 352–374; (rules 100–102).
111See, in particular, art. 14 ICCPR.
112For comprehensive discussions of the legality of trials by non-state groups under IHL, see Jonathan Somer,
Jungle Justice: Passing Sentence on the Equality of Belligerents in Non-International Armed Conflict, 89 INTERNATIONAL
REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 655 (2007).; Sandesh Sivakumaran, Courts of Armed Opposition Groups: Fair Trials or
Summary Justice?, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 489, (2009).
113Somer, supra note 112, at 687.
114Doswald-Beck & Henckaerts, supra note 83, at 355.
115Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, para. 34, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000).
116Doswald-Beck & Henckaerts, supra note 83, at 371.
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offence “under the law.” Thus, it has been suggested that the principle of nullum crimen sine lege
should be interpreted as to include laws adopted by non-state groups in the territory they
control.117 However, in practice a solution may not be as simple: as control over territory is often
contested during internal armed conflicts, parallel legislation could require individuals to comply
with different, possibly conflicting, laws adopted by the different conflicting parties. Still, if armed
groups control territory and are therefore required to respect fundamental human rights of the
people under their control, these groups must also be permitted to adopt legislation. For example,
if an armed group liberated parts of a state’s territory from the tyrannical rule of a dictator, it
would be contrary to the idea of justice and the rule of law if it was unable to change certain
legislation of the ousted regime.
In practice, due to the very different characteristics of non-state armed groups and circumstance
in which they operate, examples of their “judicial systems” vary widely.118 As also seen in the Syria
conflict, especially during the first years of armed confrontations when non-state groups do not
exercise stable control over territory and do not dispose of sufficient resources, they normally do
not operate judicial systems that come anywhere close to what international law requires.119 Yet,
in situations where conflicts become protracted and non-state groups exercise significant territorial
control, they may establish more sophisticated “judicial systems.” For examples, during civil war in
El Salvador, the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) considered that IHL
presupposes that state and non-state parties can prosecute penal law violations, and that
guarantees of independence and impartiality do not require that courts be established in
accordance with state law.120 Accordingly, they established and operated a quasi-judicial system in
the territory they controlled. Yet, the courts and the FMLN have been criticized for not meeting due
process guarantees.121
While practical challenges remain, interpreting the requirement of a regularly constituted court
and the principle of nullum crimen sine lege in the ways suggested here does not contradict the
letter of the law and reflects practical challenges in contemporary armed conflicts. While it
arguably lowers the applicable standards, it does not lower the protection of the individual against
unfair prosecutions to an unacceptable extent. Under the suggested system, any trial must still
respect a significant list of fair trial guarantees, which on the one hand require capacities which
not all armed groups possess, but on the other hand maintain a level of protection that
international law requires for any trial. Especially when considering death sentences as reportedly
imposed by non-state groups’ tribunals in Syria, these minimum guarantees are indispensible.
However, as to the question of whether and under which conditions non-state groups can lawfully
convict individuals under their control, any group is well advised not to execute any detainee.
V. CONCLUSION
Non-state armed groups are subject to different international legal regimes, including international
humanitarian, international criminal, and also international human rights law. In the light of the
devastating crisis in Syria, international lawyers have both clarified existing legal rules and raised
arguments that further develop international law. Following the evolvement of the crisis from
peaceful demonstrations into a civil war, Syria presents a rich example for a legal analysis of at
what stage confrontations between the opposing parties turn from internal disturbances into an
armed conflict. This also determines which fields of international law applies in the situation: IHRL
exclusively or IHRL and IHL. Under IHL, an armed conflict exists only if there are armed
confrontations between at least two organized forces. If a state employs significant violence
against unorganized armed groups that are not able to engage in combat this does not amount to
an armed conflict; but may, rather, constitute a crime against humanity. Once the armed conflict
threshold is met, all parties to the conflict have equal obligations under IHL, and certain violations
of this regime may amount to war crimes.
117See Sivakumaran, supra note 112, at 507–509.
118For a good overview of practice by different armed groups, see David Tuck, Detention by Armed Groups:
Overcoming Challenges to Humanitarian Action, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 761–764 (2011).
119This has also been explained, for example, by a former leaders of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
See Sandesh Sivakumaran, supra note 112, at 494.
120For further discussion, see id., at 491–492.
121Related criticism has also been raised against courts operated by the LTTT. See id., at 491–494.
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A contested but very important legal question that emerged prominently in the Syria crisis is
whether non-state groups bear international human rights law obligations, especially before the
crisis developed into a non-international armed conflict. In a progressive finding, the UN
Commission of Inquiry argued that states, individuals, and non-state collective entities are bound
by peremptory human rights norms. With this finding, the Commission went one step further than
previous UN Commissions or special mandate holders, which emphasized that human rights
obligations bind groups that exercise territorial control. By applying peremptory human rights
norms to armed groups that were neither in effective control over territory nor party to an armed
conflict, the Commission of Inquiry answered a recurring call by different legal experts that some
fundamental humanitarian provisions must pertain at all times and be respected by any actor.122
Direct human rights obligations for non-state entities are particularly relevant where such groups
act beyond states’ control.
In any situation of internal disturbances or armed conflicts, in order to achieve minimum
protection of all persons affected by the violence engagement with state and non-state actors is
essential. Unlike state forces, which normally have a basic training in human rights and
humanitarian law, non-state groups that draw their members from the civilian population are
unlikely to possess this knowledge. Even if the state bluntly disregards the most fundamental
humanitarian provisions, an armed group that claims legitimate representation of the people and
wishes to liberate a country cannot commit war crimes or grave human rights violations against its
people. Engaging such groups on the applicable humanitarian norms is vital.123 However, in order
to provide clear instructions to non-state groups on which international obligations they have,
lawyers need to determine which legal regimes apply and bind armed groups. A clarification of
this point has been the aim of the present article.
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